- Mon Mar 07, 2016 3:04 pm
#384540
I think it's just plain old faulty, human nature to state things in terms or black/white, right/wrong, absolutes, ultimates, etc. It takes training or education to overcome habits like these and to decode what we read and hear and to filter out opinion stated as fact or certainty. I believe the vast majority of our readers do filter out the chaff from the wheat and hopefully they see the seriousness of storing an extension loop on a glider by taping it in place.
For me, the takeaway from this discussion is to think long and hard about how we store our own or others store their extension loops. When there is no single way of doing things and pilots borrow one another's gliders or harness and then run into a method that differs from their own. But the pilot/owner isn't there to explain that 'thing' they forgot to mention. And so accidents like this one will recur for more or less the same likely reason that this one happened in the first place.
For me the single-most critical component of pre-flight is verification. If a critical attachment device like a hang loop extension is obscured by tape or be a series of larks heads or anything that prevents direct visual verification of correct routing and attachment then there is the probability of a preventable failure of the device.
Ryan seems to be doing his typically good job of driving home the importance of operator error(s). This cannot be overlooked. But what happens when the operator is thwarted from verifying a critical connection because his ability to do so is thwarted by something that's in the way? In this case it was tape that sounds like it prevented observing the routing of the extension loop(s).
At what point does a operator (pilot) start dismantling his own or another person's flying gear in order verify the integrity of the flying equipment? How many layers of tape to we remove? How many zippers or Velcro flaps do we open? Do we do a side wire stomp test on someone else's glider to verify the cables will survive long enough in flight to reach reserve deployment altitude?
Imagine what would have happens to this East Coast pilot had he separated too low for his reserve to work but too high to survive the impact? Just like Rick Master's complaint about PGs, we too have a Dead-Zone. There is a proximity to terrain where our reserve may not help us and we our left to the quality of our pre-flights and flying decisions.
Not a matter to be taken lightly.
For me, the takeaway from this discussion is to think long and hard about how we store our own or others store their extension loops. When there is no single way of doing things and pilots borrow one another's gliders or harness and then run into a method that differs from their own. But the pilot/owner isn't there to explain that 'thing' they forgot to mention. And so accidents like this one will recur for more or less the same likely reason that this one happened in the first place.
For me the single-most critical component of pre-flight is verification. If a critical attachment device like a hang loop extension is obscured by tape or be a series of larks heads or anything that prevents direct visual verification of correct routing and attachment then there is the probability of a preventable failure of the device.
Ryan seems to be doing his typically good job of driving home the importance of operator error(s). This cannot be overlooked. But what happens when the operator is thwarted from verifying a critical connection because his ability to do so is thwarted by something that's in the way? In this case it was tape that sounds like it prevented observing the routing of the extension loop(s).
At what point does a operator (pilot) start dismantling his own or another person's flying gear in order verify the integrity of the flying equipment? How many layers of tape to we remove? How many zippers or Velcro flaps do we open? Do we do a side wire stomp test on someone else's glider to verify the cables will survive long enough in flight to reach reserve deployment altitude?
Imagine what would have happens to this East Coast pilot had he separated too low for his reserve to work but too high to survive the impact? Just like Rick Master's complaint about PGs, we too have a Dead-Zone. There is a proximity to terrain where our reserve may not help us and we our left to the quality of our pre-flights and flying decisions.
Not a matter to be taken lightly.